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COUTHINO, CARO AND COMPANY, INC. AND FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE CO. v. M/V SAVA ET. AL. 
United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 28 June 1988 
849F.2d 166 
A provision in the bill of lading referring to COGS A does not provide constructive notice of the $500 per package limitation 
of liability to a shipper. 
FACTS: In December of 1983, Couthino, Caro and Company, 
Inc. iCouthinol, a steel importer, purchased 420 coils of steel 
from a manufacturer in Spain for shipment to New Orleans, 
Louisiana. The steel was loaded aboard the M/V Sava in Spain 
and stowed in holds four and six. Two marine surveyors observed 
and recorded the loading. 
During the voyage, inclement weather conditions neces­
sitated ventilation of the cargo by opening the holds as the M/V 
Sava lacked a forced ventilation system to control the dewpoint 
in the holds. 
When the cargo was discharged in New Orleans in February, 
the coils evidenced varying degrees of rusting. A clearly defined 
waterline on the coils from hold four and standing water in hold 
six, indicated the presence of seawater in both holds. After two 
of Couthino's buyers received their portion of the shipment and 
complained of heavy rust damage, Couthino collected the coils 
at a warehouse in Chicago. Examination of the coils suggested 
flooding of the holds during the voyage and carriage of the cargo 
in a moisture saturated environment. Subsequently, the damaged 
coils were either sold at salvage or subject to depreciation 
allowances. 
Couthino and its insurer, Fireman's Fund, brought suit 
against M/V Sava for the damaged cargo in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The district 
court ruled in favor of the shipper, Couthino, but limited the 
vessel's liability to $500 per coil. Couthino appealed the order 
regarding the limitation of liability. The owner of the M/V Sava 
cross-appeals, challenging the lower court's finding concerning 
the condition of the cargo. 
ISSUE: Did M/V Sava afford the cargo shipper a fair opportun­
ity to avoid the $500/package limitation of liability by merely 
adducing a provision in the bill of lading that referred to COGSA? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit de­
termined that the clause in the bill of lading did not provide 
constructive notice to Couthino of the content ofCOGSA's limi­
tation of liability provision. 
The court noted that the case hinged on the carrier's and 
shipper's respective burden of prooof under Title 46 USC § 1304 
15l ICOGSAl. This section limits the liability of a carrier to $500 
per package for loss or damages in connection with the transpor­
tation of goods unless the shipper specifies a desire to increase 
the cargo's valuation in excess of that amount. 
In order to benefit from this limitation provision, the courts 
have held that the carrier bears the initial burden of showing 
that it offered the shipper a fair opportunity to avoid the limitation, 
General Electric Co. u. M/V Nedlloyd, 817 F.2d 1022 i 2d Cir. 
1987),cert denied, -- U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. 710,98 L.Ed.2d 661 
( 1988). Yet, the circuits differ as to what evidence establishes a 
carrier's prima facie case of fair opportunity, Wuerttembergische 
u. M/V Stuttgart Express, 711 F.2d 621 15th Cir. 1983). The 
district court r:ited prior court rulings which stated that mere 
incorporation ofCOGSA by reference is insufficient evidence of 
fair notice. However, the district court relied upon the erroneous 
premise that the Fifth Circuit had rejected the rationale of these 
cases. In so doing, the district court concluded that the bill of 
lading, which only mentioned COGSA, provided the shipper with 
adequate notice of § 1304 15l, thereby constituting sufficient 
evidence of fair opportunity actually existed. The Court of Appe­
als for the Fifth Circuit pointed out that, in those cases cited, 
inclusion ofCOGSA was not the determinative factor. Instead, 
this court relied on evidence that the carrier clearly afforded the 
shipper the option to declare a valuation of its cargo after review­
ing the various shipping rates. 
In the case at bar, the bill of lading contained no such alterna­
tive. Therefore, since the carrier did not make its threshold 
showing, the shipper has no burden of proof and the M/V Sava is 
not entitled to limited liability. 
The owner of the M/V Sava contended that the coils were not 
delivered to the ship in good condition. Couthino conversely 
argued that it sought damages due to the extensive rusting of 
the steel while aboard the M/V Sava and not for minor man­
ufacturing defects. In Camemint Food Inc. u. Brasileiro, 647 
F.2d 347,355 i2d Cir. 1981) the court stated that "Plaintiff must 
show that the goods were delivered to the carrier free of the 
damages for which recovery is sought." 
In this instance, expert testimony indicated that the steel was 
free of corrosive rust when delivered to the M/V Sava. The 
district court correctly reasoned that the coils were in good 
condition when the carrier received them and rejected the owner 
of the M/V Sava's claim. 
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the district 
court as to finding the M/V Sava liable, reversed the judgment 
as to the limitation of liability and remanded the case for a 
determination of damages. This decision thus brings the Second 
and Fifth Circuit into agreement on this issue. 
Susan Lysaght '91 
FLOYD v. LYKES BROS. STEAMSHIP CO., INC. 
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit, 9 March 1988 
844 F.2d 1044 
Absent embalming and mortuary facilities, the burial at sea of a deceased seaman rests in the discretion of the ship's captain. 
FACTS: James H. Floyd IFloydl was a seaman aboard the S.S. 
Shirley Lykes, owned and operated by Lykes Steamship Company 
of New Orleans, Louisiana !hereinafter "Lykes"l. On August 
19, 1983, while the vessel was passing through the Straits of 
Gibraltar enroute to Canada and the United States, Floyd met 
his demise by heart attack. At sea and eight days from port, the 
captain ordered and the crew made ready a burial at sea. On the 
following morning, August 20th, a message was sent to Lykes in 
New Orleans informing management of the death and pending 
burial of the deceased. That afternoon the crew positioned the 
flag draped remains at the ships stern and, after a brief service 
and eulogy by the captain, Floyd slid to his watery grave. The 
captain informed Lykes that the burial had been completed. 
Prior to the burial, neither the ship nor Lykes had notified 
Floyd's next-of-kin of the death. 
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Suit was initiated by Maria Floyd IMarial, daughter of the 
deceased, in the District Court for the Eastern District of Penn­
sylvania, alleging wrongful death and improper disposition of 
the remains, against Lykes. The district court granted de­
fendant's summary judgment motion and dismissed the wrongful 
death count for lack of evidence. As to Count two, improper 
disposition of the body, the district court dismissed the claim as 
to Maria's brothers, sisters and mother, also plaintiffs, on the 
grounds that only the next-of-kin may properly bring such action. 
Thereafter, the district court granted Lykes summary motion 
and dismissed the complaint. Maria appeals the dismissal of 
Count two as to herself only. 
(Continued ... ) 
Floyd v. Lykes (Cont.) 
ISSUE: Is it proper for a ships captain to perform a burial at 
sea, without prior notification of the next-of-kin, when the vessel 
is eight days from port? 
ANALYSIS: Plaintiff argued on appeal that state tort law 
established a quasi-property right to the body of the deceased in 
the next-of-kin and that state law was or should be incorporated 
into the general maritime law. Agreeing that maritime law 
applied and citing Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 
F.2d 257,259 (2d Cir. 1963), cert denied 376 U.S. 949 (1964), the 
court held that it could "look to the law prevailing on the land" 
only when the maritime law was silent. Absent a maritime 
statute, the case should be governed by general maritime case 
law, United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 409 
(1975); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160-61 
( 1920), and state law may not be applied where it would conflict 
with maritime law, Coastal Iron Works, Inc. v. Petty Ray 
Geophysical, 783 F.2d 577, 582 (5th Cir. 1986). 
The court looked to Brambir v. Cunard White Star, Ltd., 37 F. 
Supp. 906, 907 <S.D.N.Y. 1940), affd mem., 119 F2.d 419 (2d 
Cir. 1941), as the leading case on point. In that case a passenger 
died eight days from port and the court held that the ship's 
master had absolute discretion over the fate of the corpse. 
Further, burial at sea is recognized as a viable option by master, 
vessel and medical guidebooks. 
Defendant cited Finley v. Atlantic Transport Co., 220 N.Y. 
249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917) to support its case. There, defendant 
provided an embalmer and morgue and additionally, was only 
twenty hours from port when the burial was effected. Other 
than this easily distinguishable case, the only authority to 
support defendant's claim was a publication by the United 
States Public Health Service entitled The Ships Medicine Chest 
and Medical Aid at Sea. That handbook contained the statement 
"[t]oday burial at sea is the exception". But no expansion of this 
statement was offered, leaving the reader inconclusive as to 
whether the meaning was that death at sea was the exception 
today due to advances in medicine and technology, or that lack 
of embalming and mortuary facilities was the exception, etc. 
Thus the plaintiffs case failed for lack of any evidence in support 
of her cause of action. 
In affirming the lower court's decision the court of appeals 
noted that plaintiff offered no statutes, cases or authorities to 
contradict Brambir's holding, that nothing in the Death on the 
High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. §§761-68, or the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. 
§688, prohibited burial at sea, and that no abuse of discretion on 
the part of the captain had been demonstrated. the court in­
sinuated that certain proof not present in the instant case might 
have allowed the action to go forward. Examples of such facts 
were if the ship had embalming and mortuary facilities (vessels 
refrigerated food locker not appropriate), or if the plaintiff had 
demonstrated both a willingness to reimburse Lykes for its 
expenses for an unplanned docking at a closer port plus the 
willingness of the port country to accept an unembalmed 
cadaver, or if the captain's decision could be classified as "ar­
bitrary, fanciful or unreasonable". 
Harold Levy '90 
SCAC TRANSPORT (USA) INC. v. S.S. DANAOS 
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, 25 Aprill988 
845 F .2d 1157 
A stevedore whose negligence has been determined to be the proximate cause of the litigation can be vouched into 
arbitration proceedings without its consent and be bound by the findings of the arbitrator. 
FACTS: The S.S. Danaos was loading cargo on a vessel when 
an accident occurred wherein the vessel's Stulken Boom collapsed 
when a pin in a winch block failed during the loading of a water 
tank truck. The truck, boom and parts of the vessel suffered 
damage. The vessel, owned by Danais Shipping Company 
(Danais), was under a time charter to Big Lift USA, Inc. and Big 
Lift Shipping Company (N.A.) Inc. (Big Lift), collectively which 
had contracted with Universal Maritime Service Corp. (Universal) 
for the stevedoring services. 
The truck's owner SCAC Transport (SCAC) commenced this 
action against Danais, Big Lift and the S.S. Danaos in rem. 
Danais cross claimed against Big Lift for indemnity. Universal 
was brought into the action by a third party claim and was cross 
claimed for indemnification by Big Lift. SCAC settled with 
Danais. Pursuant to the charter-party between Danais and Big 
Lift any dispute was to be arbitrated in London. Universal was 
not a party to this agreement. 
Big Lift tendered the defense to Universal with regard to the 
London arbitration and required Universal to appear in defense 
of the action and to indemnify Big Lift. Universal was advised 
that refusal or neglect of the notice would bar it from objecting to 
the outcome of the arbitration. 
The arbitration ruling was in favor of Danais, and the steve­
dore's negligence was found to be the proximate cause. Damages 
included vessel repairs, loss of charter hire, interest and at­
torney's fees. Universal again declined to assume the defense, 
when Big Lift informed it that an appeal before the Commercial 
Court in London was to be heard. After Universal declined to 
assume defense of the claim and prosecution of the special cases, 
Big Lift instructed its London solicitors to terminate appeal. Big 
Lift then commenced an action in the District Court. 
The District Court, affirming the finding of the London arbit­
ration as to negligence, found that Big Lift was entitled to 
indemnity. The damages awarded, however, did not include 
attorney's fees becuase the court determined they were beyond 
what Universal could reasonably contemplate when hired as a 
stevedore. 
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ISSUE: Whether a stevedore without its consent may be 
vouched into an arbitration where the stevedore is the charterer's 
indemnitor? 
ANALYSIS: The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
reversed the district court and held that absent a particularized 
showing of prejudice, a stevedore may be vouched into arbitration 
under a charter party by a charterer where the stevedore is the 
charterer's indemnitor. The district court's decision as to at-
torney's fees was reversed. 
' 
Under the common-law practice of voucher, a defendant or 
indemnitee who seeks indemnification from a third party or 
indemnitor must serve a notice to defend on the third party. This 
notice informs the indemnitor of the action against the de­
fendant and offers the opportunity to defend the action. 
If the defense is not assumed, the defendant may bring a 
separate action later to recover its indemnity. The indemnitor 
can dispute the existence and extent of the indemnity. See 
Humble Oil & Ref Co. v. Philadelphia Ship Maintenance Co., 
444 F.2d 727 (3rd Cir. 1971). The third party will be collaterally 
estopped from relitigating issues decided in the first action in all 
of the elements of the adjudicatory procedure are met. 
Arbitration is cited as an important, efficient and equitable 
means of dispute resolution when arbitrators are experienced in 
maritime matters and the evidence is extensive. The Second 
Circuit noted the procedural aspects of arbitration and court 
adjudication and concluded contrary to the district court's rul­
ing that the notice received by Universal had no preclusive 
effect; that absent a particularized showing of harm, procedural 
differences between arbitration and the judicial process are not 
grounds for denying a preclusive effect to vouching in notice. 
Universal did not demonstrate any prejudice suffered as a result 
of the London arbitration. 
For reasons of efficiency vouching is permitted. Stevedores 
are well aware that charter parties contain arbitration clauses 
to which they as potential indemnitees are bound. Absent a 
(Continued ... ) 
